Public vs private administration of rural health insurance schemes: a comparative study in Zhejiang of China. by Zhou, Xiaoyuan et al.
Zhou, XY; Mao, ZZ; Rechel, B; Liu, CJ; Jiang, JL; Zhang, YY (2013)
Public vs private administration of rural health insurance schemes:
a comparative study in Zhejiang of China. Health economics, policy,
and law, 8 (3). pp. 269-288. ISSN 1744-1331
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/1105179/
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual au-
thors and/or other copyright owners
Health Economics, Policy and Law
http://journals.cambridge.org/HEP
Additional services for Health Economics, Policy and Law:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Public vs private administration of rural health insurance 
schemes: a comparative study in Zhejiang of China
Xiaoyuan Zhou, Zhengzhong Mao, Bernd Rechel, Chaojie Liu, Jialin Jiang and Yinying Zhang
Health Economics, Policy and Law / Volume 8 / Issue 03 / July 2013, pp 269 ­ 288
DOI: 10.1017/S1744133112000163, Published online: 04 October 2012
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744133112000163
How to cite this article:
Xiaoyuan Zhou, Zhengzhong Mao, Bernd Rechel, Chaojie Liu, Jialin Jiang and Yinying Zhang 
(2013). Public vs private administration of rural health insurance schemes: a comparative study in 
Zhejiang of China. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 8, pp 269­288 doi:10.1017/
S1744133112000163
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/HEP, IP address: 194.80.229.244 on 06 Aug 2013
Health Economics, Policy and Law (2013), 8, 269–288 & Cambridge University Press 2012
doi:10.1017/S1744133112000163 First published online 4 October 2012
Public vs private administration of rural
health insurance schemes: a comparative
study in Zhejiang of China
XIAOYUAN ZHOU
Lecturer, Huaxi School of Public Health, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
ZHENGZHONG MAO*
Professor, Huaxi School of Public Health, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
BERND RECHEL
Researcher, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine, London, UK
CHAOJIE LIU
Associate Professor, School of Public Health of La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
JIALIN JIANG
Lecturer, Huaxi School of Public Health, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
YINYING ZHANG
Lecturer, Huaxi School of Public Health, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
Abstract : Since 2003, China has experimented in some of the country’s
counties with the private administration of the New Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS), a publicly subsidized health insurance scheme
for rural populations. Our study compared the effectiveness and efficiency
of private vs public administration in four counties in one of China’s
most affluent provinces in the initial stage of the NCMS’s implementation.
The study was undertaken in Ningbo city of Zhejiang province. Out of
10 counties in Ningbo, two counties with private administration for the
NCMS (Beilun and Ninghai) were compared with two others counties with
public administration (Zhenhai and Fenghua), using the following indicators:
(1) proportion of enrollees who were compensated for inpatient care;
(2) average reimbursement–expense ratio per episode of inpatient care;
(3) overall administration cost; (4) enrollee satisfaction. Data from 2004 to
2006 were collected from the local health authorities, hospitals and the
contracted insurance companies, supplemented by a randomized household
questionnaire survey covering 176 households and 479 household members.
In our sample counties, private administration of the NCMS neither reduced
transaction costs, nor improved the benefits of enrollees. Enrollees covered by
the publicly administered NCMS were more likely to be satisfied with the
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insurance scheme than those covered by the privately administered NCMS.
Experience in the selected counties suggests that private administration of the
NCMS did not deliver the hoped-for results. We conclude that caution needs
to be exercised in extending private administration of the NCMS.
Key messages
> New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) is a publicly funded insurance
scheme for rural populations in China.
> No differences in reimbursement rates and transaction costs were found
between the public and private administrations of the NCMS.
> People were more likely to be satisfied with the public administration of the
NCMS for its ease of reimbursement arrangement compared with the private
administration model.
> The hoped-for benefits associated with private administration of the NCMS
have so far failed to realize.
Introduction
Private administration of publicly funded programs has been encouraged in many
countries in the hope that it would help improve quality and efficiency. Examples
include the introduction of managed competition in Latin America (Vargas et al.,
2010), the rise of innovative social enterprises in a range of low- and middle-income
countries (Bhattacharyya et al., 2010), and the increasing popularity of public–private
partnerships worldwide (Hanlin et al., 2007). Many countries have been attracted by
the assumption that inefficiency is deeply rooted within public systems (Bryce, 2000)
and that greater efficiency can be achieved through a clear separation between
funders and providers of health services, as this would help to introduce com-
petition among providers (Walsh, 1995; Rechel and McKee, 2009). The split
between funders and providers enables governments to enter into contract-like
arrangements with providers from both the public and private sector.
In the academic community, debates continue on whether the private sector is
more efficient than the public sector in managing and providing health services
(Duckett and Jackson, 2000). Some researchers argue that commissioning the
private sector to deliver public services could further reduce the already inadequate
resources in the public sector, a problem that has surfaced in many high-income
countries with public–private partnerships (Duckett and Jackson, 2000; McKee
et al., 2006). Contract-like arrangements have also been criticized for weakening
governmental capacity for protecting public interests (Schick, 1998).
Despite these debates, many industrialized countries have opted for contract-
like arrangements, decoupling policy-making functions from the administration
and delivery of services and giving rise to ‘internal markets’ (Schick, 1998;
Palmer, 2000). Various forms of contracts and contractual relationships have
evolved in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and
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the United States (Palmer, 2000), in the hope that contract-like arrangements
allow governments to focus on outputs rather than inputs, enhancing organi-
zational performance (Schick, 1998). Furthermore, there is growing interest in
applying management techniques from the private to the public sector, often
labelled as ‘new public management’, which has underpinned a range of public
sector reforms since the 1980s (Lane, 2003). At the same time, theories of
polycentricity have emphasized that traditional divisions of the public and private
sector are often misleading, and that diverse organizations, including private
enterprises, can deliver public goods (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1999).
Given the limited resources and inefficiency of public administrations in developing
countries, it is understandable that many have considered adopting contract-like
arrangements. However, most developing countries are unlikely to achieve the same
level of success as their more developed counterparts, as the conditions of success for
contract-like arrangements are often absent, including a robust market sector and
established mechanisms for enforcing contracts (Schick, 1998).
China has now progressed into a transitional stage, moving from a planned to a
market economy. The last four decades have witnessed dramatic economic growth.
This ‘miracle’ of economic development has been attributed, at least partly, to
‘contract responsibility’ arrangements between governmental departments and
executives of state-owned enterprises (Tsui et al., 2006). In recent years, attempts
have been made to extrapolate a similar model into the health sector. Some local
(county) governments have contracted private health insurance companies to
administer the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), a government-subsidized
medical insurance scheme for rural residents. It is unclear, however, whether these
reforms will produce the results hoped for by local governments. The intention of our
study was to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of private administration of the
NCMS in selected counties of the country.
The NCMS
Over the last decade, China’s health reforms have gathered momentum. The
development of the NCMS has become one of the fastest growing and most
significant elements of reforms. The NCMS is a revised version of the earlier
Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), which collapsed after 1978 with the
dissolution of collective farming through which the CMS had been funded
(Wagstaff et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2009b). By 2003, nearly 80% of rural residents
did not have any form of health insurance and poor health had become an
important cause of rural poverty (Zhang et al., 2009). In 2003, the Chinese
government established the NCMS, hoping that it would improve the health of
rural populations, safeguard economic development and enhance social cohesion
(Ministry of Health et al., 2003; Klotzbu¨cher et al., 2010).
The NCMS is jointly financed by enrollees and governmental agencies at the
county, municipality, provincial and national levels. It is a national initiative,
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based initially on fee-for-service payment method. The NCMS covers medical
services only, excluding preventive care and public health services. Enrollees are
reimbursed for medical expenses when they incur those expenses through eligible
medical facilities. The NCMS’s main objectives are to improve access of rural
residents to medical care, reduce catastrophic medical expenditure, and diminish
inequities in access to medical care between rich and poor (Yip and Hsiao, 2009;
Sun et al., 2009a). In contrast to the mandatory medical insurance schemes
for urban employees (Wagstaff et al., 2009), the NCMS is a voluntary scheme,
in which individual contributions are matched by government contributions
(Klotzbu¨cher et al., 2010). A distinguishing feature of the NCMS is that counties
enjoy considerable autonomy in determining the design and administration of
the scheme (Brown and Theoharides, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; Babiarz et al.,
2010; Klotzbu¨cher et al., 2010). Consequently, policies vary considerably across
counties with regard to the funding level of per capita premiums and entitle-
ments for the insured, such as medical conditions that are not covered by the
NCMS and requirements for deductibles and co-payments (Lei and Lin, 2009;
Sun et al., 2009a).
By 2010, the NCMS had grown to more than 800 million enrollees (Alcorn
and Bao, 2011). There is evidence to suggest that this has improved the acces-
sibility of primary care in rural China. For example, a nationally representative
study of 160 village primary care clinics and 8339 individuals in 2004–2007
found a decline of out-of-pocket expenditure and a reduced exposure to financial
risk (Babiarz et al., 2010).
With the rapid growth of the funding pool, fund management has attracted
increasing attention from national and international observers. So far, two fund
management models have emerged. The majority of counties have adopted a public
administration model, in which county health departments are responsible for
managing the NCMS funds. At the same time, a number of counties, scattered
throughout approximately a quarter of all provinces, have adopted a private
administration model, in which private for-profit insurance companies have been
contracted to manage NCMS funds (Lv, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). By the end of
2006, 66 counties had implemented the private administration model, accounting
for 4.6% of all counties that had started to introduce the NCMS (Chen, 2007).
A growing number of insurance companies are competing to administer NCMS
funds, arguing that they are better prepared than the public administration, with
both skilled human resources and extensive experience in financial risk manage-
ment. Yet, while more and more counties are considering the option of out-con-
tracting the administration of the NCMS to the private sector, little is known on
whether the insurance companies can deliver on their promises.
A considerable number of studies examining the NCMS have been published in
recent years, covering such aspects as reimbursement for catastrophic payment for
illness (Yip and Hsiao, 2009; Sun et al., 2009b), enrolment (Wang et al., 2008),
participant satisfaction (Liu et al., 2008), out-of-pocket expenditure (Lei and
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Lin, 2009), medical impoverishment (Yip and Hsiao, 2009), financial protection
of patients with chronic disease (Sun et al., 2009a), and prescribing behaviour of
village doctors (Sun et al., 2009b). However, the management of the scheme has so
far failed to attract attention. Although a number of articles on the two management
models in the NCMS have been published in Chinese-language periodicals (Wang
et al., 2005; Zhang and Zhang, 2006; Zhang et al., 2006; Guo, 2007; Meng et al.,
2007; Shu, 2007; Zhou and Zhengzhong, 2009), our study is, to our knowledge, the
first empirical investigation of the performance of the two models.
Methods
Our study aimed to answer the following two research questions:
1. What is the impact of private administration on the benefits of the insured as
compared with public administration?
2. Is the private sector more efficient in managing the NCMS funds than the public
sector?
Research setting
The study was undertaken in Ningbo city of Zhejiang province, one of China’s
most affluent provinces, located on the eastern coast of China. In 2006, the
average per capita income of rural residents amounted to 8847 yuan (GBP 837/
USD 1296). Of the 87 counties in Zhejiang, eight had commissioned private
insurance companies to manage NCMS funds in 2006.
Ningbo has ten counties. Two counties, Beilun and Ninghai, had respectively
commissioned the local branches of China Life (the biggest life insurance
company of China) to manage the NCMS fund, while the other eight had opted
for a public administration model. In our study, we compared the two counties
with a private administration model for the NCMS with two counties (Fenghua
and Zhenhai) that had chosen the public administration model. Fenghua and
Zhenhai were specifically chosen for having similar demographic and economic
characteristics as Beilun and Ninghua. In Ningbo, NCMS enrollees contributed
about 36% of premiums, except for Beilun, where township-run enterprises
made a significant contribution (Table 1). Until 2007, due to its advanced
economic status, Ningbo was ineligible to receive a central government financial
subsidy for the NCMS. Since 2007, more affluent eastern areas of China,
including Zhejiang province, have received central subsidies comparable to the
country’s western and middle areas.
In 2004 in Beilun, the local government invited the insurance companies that had
a local branch to bid for the administration of the NCMS fund. Three insurance
companies submitted proposals. China Life eventually won the bid, as its proposal
contained the lowest administration costs, while still being committed to a serious
investment in human resources, including one or two full-time staff managing the
NCMS in each town (for a total of eight towns). Competitors doubted the financial
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Table 1. The fund management arrangements for the NCMS in the four counties of Ningbo (in 2006)
County Eligibility to enroll Premium contribution Fund holder Benefit policy Commission fee
Beilun 1. Locally registered
rural residents
1. Government
contributions
The county health department
collected the NCMS funds
and transferred the whole
funds to the contracted
insurance company. The
insurance company took the
financial risk
The insurance company
developed the benefit
policy, which was subject
to endorsement by the
county health department
An annual commission fee
was paid to the insurance
company on condition that
the company complied with
the terms and conditions of
the contract
2. Migrant workers
employed by the
township-run
enterprises
2. Individual
contributions
3. Local people who
lost farm land and
who are not covered
by urban health
insurance schemes
3. Township-run
enterprises for migrant
workers
4. Others (e.g.
donations)
Ninghai Local people who are
not covered by urban
insurance schemes
1. Government
contributions
The county health department
collected the NCMS funds
and transferred the amount of
payout (reimbursement to the
insured) to the contracted
insurance company. The
county health department
took the financial risk
The county health
department developed the
benefit policy and the
contracted insurance
company implemented the
policy
Annual commission fee was
paid to the insurance
company on condition that
the company fulfilled the
defined performance targets
2. Individual
contributions
3. Others (e.g.
donations)
Fenghua Local residents who are
not covered by urban
health insurance
schemes
1. Government
contributions
The county health department
collected and administered the
NCMS funds under the
supervision of the county
finance department
The county health
department developed and
implemented the benefit
policy
Not applicable
2. Individual
contributions
3. Others (e.g.
donations)
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Zhenhai 1. Locally registered
rural residents
1. Government
contributions
The county health department
collected and administered the
use of the NCMS funds
The county health
department developed and
implemented the benefit
policy
Not applicable
2. Retired people from
the township-run
enterprises
2. Individual
contributions
3. Others (e.g.
donations)
NCMS5New Cooperative Medical Scheme.
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viability of the plan, while China Life’s projected costings were clearly influenced by
strategic considerations, including the large commercial life insurance market of the
rural population. The responsibilities of the Beilun branch of China Life included
assisting the government with premium collection, training staff in NCMS fund
management, administering reimbursement claims, compiling financial reports and
accepting financial audit. The local government retained the ownership of personal
data gathered in the course of private fund management. The contract was valid for
three years and renewable on condition that the performance of the contracted
insurance company (including financial management and the benefit of enrollees)
were satisfactory to the local government.
Ninghai adopted a simpler approach. The local government commissioned
China Life to manage the NCMS fund based on the assumption that the company
had a strong track record in financial risk management. China Life was only
allowed to administer claim reimbursement. In contrast to Beilun, the terms and
conditions of the contract between Ninghai county government and China Life
were not well articulated and somehow ambiguous.
The per capita premium level varied across the four counties. While Ninghai
maintained a stable premium level over the years 2004–2006, the other three
counties increased their premium levels to differing extents. Overall, Zhenhai
took the lead in terms of contributions from the government and individuals.
However, the governmental contribution in Beilun was larger than that of
Zhenhai in 2006. The significant surge in government contribution to Beilun
was made to equalize its premium level to the others (Table 2).
The benefit policy for the insured also varied across the four counties.
However, all imposed a reimbursement cap (30,000 RMB in Zhenhai and
20,000 RMB in the other three counties) for an episode of hospital care beyond
which no compensation would be made to the insured (Table 3).
Sampling and data collection
Data were collected using a set of standardized survey instruments developed by
the Ministry of Health for routine reporting on the operations of the NCMS
(Mao and Jiang, 2005). The data sets used for analysis in this study included
administrative and financial accounts of the NCMS for the period of 2004–2006
and a questionnaire survey undertaken in 2006 on enrollee satisfaction. We also
interviewed four local health officials (one for each county) and two hospital
managers (from Beilun and Fenghua, respectively) to provide additional infor-
mation on the development and managerial arrangements for the NCMS.
A stratified random sampling strategy was employed to select the ques-
tionnaire respondents. Townships of the four counties were first classified into
three strata according to their economic status. One township from the middle
band was randomly selected from each of the counties. Then, villages of the
selected townships were divided into two economic categories; one village
276 X I A O Y U A N Z H O U E T A L .
Table 2. Premium contributions per capita in the four counties in 2004–2006
2004 (RMB) 2005 (RMB) 2006 (RMB)
Government Individual Total Government Individual Total Government Individual Total
Beilun 30 20 50 30 20 50 103 20 123
Ninghai 53 30 83 53 30 83 53 30 83
Fenghua 37.4 21.2 58.6 55 30 85 60 30 90
Zhenhai 70 35/70* 105/140* 70 35/70* 105/140* 90 40/80* 130/170*
*In Zhenhai, township-run enterprises made two-fold increased contributions on behalf of their retired workers.
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Table 3. Benefit policy for hospital inpatient services in the four counties (in 2006)
Beilun Ninghai Fenghua Zhenhai
Deductible
Township hospital 500 200 200 500 for designated hospital, 1000
County hospital 500 1000 500 for non-designated hospital
Above county hospital 500 1000 500
Co-payment (based on 30% <3000 30% <2000 50% <10,000 20% <3000
health expenditure) 40% 3001–10,000 40% 2001–5000 60% 10,001–30,000 30% 3001–5000
50% 10,001–30,000 50% 5001–10000 70% .30,000 50% 5001–10,000
70% .30,000 60% .10,000 70% .10,000
Cap (the highest
reimbursement)
20,000 20,000 20,000 30,000
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from each category was randomly selected for each county. This amounted to a
total of eight villages. In each selected village, 23 households were randomly
selected. The questionnaire was administered through a face-to-face interview by
a group of trained postgraduate students and researchers from Huaxi School of
Public Health of Sichuan University. One respondent from each of the selected
households (usually the household head or the person who was believed to be
most familiar with the NCMS by the household members) was interviewed.
The questionnaire was composed of 36 closed-ended questions and one open-
ended question, measuring (1) demographic characteristics; (2) health status;
(3) health service utilization; (4) reimbursement from the NCMS; and (5) satisfac-
tion with the NCMS. In total, 180 households were approached and completed the
survey. From the 180 returned questionnaires, 176 (98%) were valid for analysis,
including 89 from the counties with privately administrated NCMS and 87 from the
counties with publicly administrated NCMS. The 176 questionnaires contained
information for 479 household members.
Data analysis
Four indicators were calculated to compare the two management models.
1. Proportion of enrollees compensated for inpatient care: this indicator represents the
proportion of enrollees who had been subsidized for inpatient care by the NCMS in
a given year. Although the indicator was not adjusted for the respective demographic
and morbidity profile (due to the unavailability of these data), it gives a rough
estimation of the accessibility of NCMS benefits, in particular in view of the
widespread speculation in China that claim reimbursement is more difficult from
private insurance companies than from a publicly administered fund.
2. Average reimbursement-expense ratio per episode of inpatient care: this
indicator represents the extent to which hospital expenditure was compensated
for by the insurance scheme.
3. Overall administration cost: the administration cost includes investments and
payments made by the county health department for running the insurance scheme.
4. Enrollee satisfaction with the administration of the NCMS: this indicator
measured the responsiveness of the NCMS to the needs of enrollees.
The statistical analysis was performed using the STATA 10.0 package. Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests were performed to test the differences between the two groups of
counties in ‘reimbursement per 100 RMB expense’ and ‘head counts compensated
for inpatient care per 100 enrollees’. Chi-square-test was performed to test the
difference in enrollee satisfaction between the groups of counties.
Results
Social-economic profiles of the study counties and questionnaire respondents
The two groups of counties had similar demographic and social-economic char-
acteristics, with a 13.77% variance in average rural per capita income (Table 4).
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Reimbursement for inpatient care
Demographic and hospital services data for 479 enrollees were collected from
the 176 questionnaire respondents (Table 5). The 479 enrollees had an average
age of 42 years and 22 (4.59%) had been admitted to hospital in 2006. No
significant differences in age and gender composition were found between the
four counties (p.0.8).
Table 4. Population and economic characteristics of the four counties
Beilun Fenghua Ninghai Zhenhai
2004
Fiscal revenue (billion yuan) 42.70 12.03 13.69 12.72
Fiscal expenditure (billion yuan) 28.24 7.78 9.51 9.36
Rural population 219,738 382,100 508,817 87,326
NCMS enrollees 214,570 44,679 434,760 97,095
Rural per capita income 6900 6225 6404 7187
2005
Fiscal revenue (billion yuan) 49.33 15.04 16.61 21.60
Fiscal expenditure (billion yuan) 27.42 11.29 11.71 11.92
Rural population 232,881 377,945 508,899 82,929
NCMS enrollees 216,768 351,470 459,669 96,514
Rural per capita income 8269 7188 6919 8030
NCMS5New Cooperative Medical Scheme.
Source: Health Departments of Beilun, Ninghai, Fenghua and Zhenhai.
Note: In Zhenhai, the number of enrollees is greater than the rural population, as it also includes
retired workers from township-run enterprises; in Fenghua, there were only two townships involved in
the NCMS in 2004, the number of enrollees increased significantly in 2005.
Table 5. Demographic characteristics of enrollees
Total Beilun Ninghai Fenghua Zhenhai
Average age (years) 41.48 46.76 38.78 40.11 41.5
,10 5.86 (5.64%) 7.2 (3.94%) 5.9 (6.76%) 5.71 (4.76%) 4.83 (7.69%)
10–59 38.22 (77.66%) 41.26 (71.65%) 30.02 (81.76%) 36.75 (80.16%) 38.46 (75.64%)
160 69.75 (16.70%) 68.84 (24.41%) 70.59 (11.49%) 68.79 (15.08%) 72.23 (16.67%)
Sex
Male 243 (50.73%) 60 (47.24%) 80 (54.05%) 66 (52.38%) 37 (47.44%)
Female 236 (49.27%) 67 (52.76%) 68 (45.95%) 60 (47.62%) 41 (52.56%)
Education
Semi- or illiterate 57 (11.90%) 4 (3.15%) 28 (18.92%) 18 (14.29%) 7 (8.97%)
Elementary school 152 (31.73%) 54 (42.52%) 32 (21.62%) 41 (32.54%) 25 (32.05%)
Secondary school 180 (37.58%) 43 (33.86%) 67 (45.27%) 49 (38.89%) 21 (26.92%)
High school 58 (12.11%) 16 (12.60%) 15 (10.14%) 12 (9.52%) 15 (19.23%)
Tertiary 8 (1.67%) 2 (1.57%) 2 (1.35%) 1 (0.79%) 3 (3.85%)
Other 24 (5.01%) 8 (6.30%) 4 (2.70%) 5 (3.97%) 7 (8.97%)
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The administrative and financial accounts showed that the majority of hospita-
lized patients were eligible to claim reimbursements from the NCMS. Only
0.4–3.2% (1.44% in Beilun, 0.44% in Ninghai, 1.14% in Fenghua and 3.22% in
Zhenhai) of inpatients failed to receive reimbursements because of the deductible
barriers. The proportion of enrollees who were compensated for inpatient care
ranged from 1.1% (Ninghai 2004) to 6.97% (Zhenhai 2006).
It seems that enrollees in the counties with a public administration model
were more likely to receive compensation from the NCMS than those in the
counties with private administration. However, this difference was not statisti-
cally significant. Similarly, enrollees in the counties with a public administration
model were more likely to receive a greater percentage of reimbursement from
the NCMS than those in the counties with a private administration model, but,
again, the difference was not statistically significant (Table 6).
Government investment and transaction cost
Local governments invested into the infrastructure that enabled the smooth
operation of the NCMS, regardless of whether the scheme was run publicly or
privately. This infrastructure included office supplies, human resources and
electronic information systems. Despite a substantial variation across counties,
no clear association between government investments and administration models
emerged (Table 7).
Table 8 shows the actual number of staff members paid for by the local
government for managing the NCMS funds. The capacity of county governments
to hire staff for managing the NCMS funds was restricted by their stringent
financial budget. This led to low staffing in the two counties with a public
administration model. Fenghua had the highest enrollee staff ratio, with one staff
member serving 58,000 enrollees. As shown in Table 8, there were eight staff
working in Beilun on managing the NCMS, but this number did not include those
working in the townships, which the insurance company failed to cover. Private
administration thus involved a higher number of staff members paid for by the local
government than public administration, although this did not seem to have been a
major cost factor for overall government investment and transaction costs.
Enrollee satisfaction
Of the 176 returned questionnaires, 42 chose ‘neutral’ as the answer to the satis-
faction survey. Respondents covered by the publicly administered NCMS were more
likely to be satisfied with the NCMS compared with those covered by the privately
administered NCMS. Over 80% of respondents covered by the publicly adminis-
tered NCMS were satisfied or very satisfied with the NCMS, 30% more than those
covered by the privately administered NCMS (x2520.8040, p50.000; Table 9).
More than half (98) of the 176 respondents held an indifferent attitude towards
‘willingness of accepting an insurance company to manage the NCMS’.
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Table 6. Comparison of benefits between enrollees covered by the private administration model and those covered by the public administration model
Private administration model Public administration model
Beilun Ninghai Zhenhai Fenghua
Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Reimbursement per 100 RMB expense 16.38 18.35 26.08 27.38 27.38 26.83 31.13 30.19 NA 22.89 23.84 24.95
Z520.405, p. jZj5 0.6858
Head counts compensated for inpatient 3.17 3.61 3.98 1.10 2.66 2.72 6.66 6.97 NA 1.39 4.05 4.36
care per 100 enrollees Z521.483, p. jZj5 0.1380
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Discussion
A growing number of low- and middle-income countries are developing
government-subsidized health insurance schemes with the aim of sharing risks
and protecting households against catastrophic illness. These schemes range
from community-based initiatives to national programmes run by governments
Table 7. Fixed asset and annual recurrent funds for managing the NCMS per
enrollee (unit: yuan per capita)
County 2004 2005 2006
Private administration model
Beilun 5.62 2.66 1.30
Ninghai 0.90 1.74 0.70
Public administration model
Zhenhai 8.31 4.29 1.96
Fenghua 25.73 2.69 1.31
NCMS5New Cooperative Medical Scheme.
Note: The value of the fixed asset has been adjusted by appreciation from 2004
to 2006 in accordance with the Law on Enterprise Income Tax of 1 January 2008.
Table 8. Human resources for managing the NCMS fund, 2004–2006
2004 2005 2006
County
Number
of staff
Enrollee
staff ratio
Number
of staff
Enrollee
staff ratio
Number
of staff
Enrollee
staff ratio
Private administration model
Beilun 8 26,800 8 27,100 8 28,400
Ninghai 26 16,700 26 17,700 26 18,000
Public administration model
Zhenhai 5 19,200 5 19,400 5 19,300
Fenghua 6 58,600 6 57,900 6 57,900
Table 9. Enrollee satisfaction
Satisfactory or very
satisfactory Neutral
Moderately or less
satisfactory
Administration
model
No. of
respondents
Proportion
(%)
No. of
respondents
Proportion
(%)
No. of
respondents
Proportion
(%)
Private 46 51.69 29 32.58 14 15.73
Public 72 82.28 13 14.94 2 2.30
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(Sun et al., 2009a). Whether publicly subsidized health insurance schemes
should be run by public or private agencies is debated internationally, including
in such high-income countries as the United States (Chernichovsky and Leibowitz,
2010). There is also an ongoing debate about how best to reform the Chinese health
system (Wagstaff et al., 2009).
Our study is one of the first attempts to empirically investigate the two admin-
istration models used in the NCMS. We found no evidence to support the argument
that private agencies are better prepared than public agencies to manage the NCMS
funds. With regard to the benefits enrollees enjoyed and the transaction costs for
managing the NCMS, we found virtually no difference between the public and
private administration models (although private administration was associated with
a higher number of government-paid staff). This finding is somewhat surprising.
A number of earlier studies have identified a lack of managerial capacity of local
governments to run the NCMS (Zhang et al., 2009). Concerns have also been
raised about the high transaction costs of the public administration of the NCMS
(Lei and Lin, 2009; You and Kobayashi, 2009). In China, private insurance com-
panies are generally assumed to be able to work more efficiently than government
agencies in administering health insurance schemes.
We also found that enrollees covered by the publicly administered NCMS
were more likely to be satisfied with the NCMS. This does not necessarily mean
that people are more satisfied with the public administration of the NCMS than
the private administration. Indeed, there has been a lack of trust in government
institutions in rural communities, which is one of the major reasons for intro-
ducing the NCMS as a voluntary scheme (Yip and Hsiao, 2009). Over the past
decades, local governments have imposed too many taxes and fees and misuse of
the funds collected has not been uncommon (You and Kobayashi, 2009).
However, it is likely that enrollees are more concerned with the benefit plan
itself than with who manages the schemes, an observation emerging from our
interviews that was also made in previous studies (Wang et al., 2003). Given the
small proportion of respondents who got real financial benefit from the NCMS
fund, it seems more appropriate to interpret the ‘satisfaction’ as a preference for
public administration. The success of contract-like arrangements for public
services depends on the maturity of formal market mechanisms (Schick, 1998).
As a transition economy, China is still facing many uncertainties. The capacity
of the government to regulate the market is limited, with many legislative and
regulatory measures still waiting to be put in place. An example of this, and one
that has so far failed to attract much attention, relates to personal information.
We noticed that only one of two county governments engaging with private health
insurance companies realized the potential problems associated with commission-
ing private companies to run the NCMS. It was unclear who would own the
enormous amount of personal data gathered in the course of administering the
NCMS and how abuse of the data for the purpose of making profit (such as
through the sale of the data to other commercial companies) could be prevented.
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Another issue deserving attention is the capacity of the private sector. As often
seen in many other low- and middle-income countries, China’s private sector has
its own problems. Private sector companies usually have poor access to tech-
nology And the skills and education of their staff is beyond the control of the
government. A strong argument in favour of contract-alike arrangements is that
the government can be freed to act as an effective agent on behalf of consumers
(Schick, 1998). However, such a role could be seriously jeopardized when the
government has to keep a very close eye on the activities undertaken by the
contracted private agencies. In the case of the counties included in our study,
Ninghai returned to the public administration model after 2007, while Beilun
decided to retain the private administration.
Our study is one of the first attempts to empirically investigate the public and
private administration of the NCMS. Restricted by the availability of data, our
study only evaluated a limited number of indicators associated with the short-term
performance of the NCMS. Moreover, we could not adjust indicators for the
demographic and morbidity profile of the covered population, as these data
were not available. Many NCMS schemes are still at an early stage of develop-
ment and further, more comprehensive and rigorous, studies will be needed to
evaluate the medium- to long-term performance of different administration
models for the NCMS. These will need to take account of hospital utilization
structures, as expenditures differ significantly across hospital levels.
Conclusions
In our sample of counties, private administration of the NCMS did not deliver
the results expected by local governments. It neither reduced transaction costs,
nor improved the benefits of enrollees. Although our findings are preliminary
and cannot be easily generalized to the rest of the country, they indicate that it
should not be taken for granted that private insurance companies operate more
efficiently and to the greater satisfaction of enrollees. We believe that greater
caution needs to be taken in extending the privatization of the administration of
the NCMS. In particular, local governments need to evaluate the capacity of the
private sector prior to commissioning services from it.
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